North Korea got the star treatment on NBC today - pictures of marching soldiers, of missiles blasting from launch pads, Kim Jung Il being Kim Jung Il, with Timmeh’s voiceover asking, can this man be stopped?

Over hyped? Definitely.

Over half the show was spent with Russert badgering Ambassador Nick Burns, the number three guy at State, to almost no avail.

Interesting to consider why Condi didn’t deem it important enough for her to be on any of the Sunday programs. Trying to minimize? Definitely.
Will we get sanctions out of the UN, asked Russert?

Amb. Burns - well, we have a very aggressive resolution proceeding there…which then became a defense of the six-party talks, and the important new development that China is sending a delegation to N. Korea - time for China to put their best foot forward, says Burns. Gee, you mean they haven’t been? Lots of words to say something not that interesting, or different than has been said by administration spokespersons for…well, for years now.

Timmeh comes back with a right jab; yeah but China and Russia are on record not wanting sanctions.

Burns then points out it’s different now; those missiles changed things. More words, lots of words on this one. What we and all six parties, and the whole world want - force North Korea back to the negotiating table.

But isn’t that what the whole point was of those missiles on the 4th of July were all about - an attention-getting device, asks Russert.

I think you could call most of this back and forth a “slow dance on the killing ground.” Burns at pains to express how deeply this administration understands how serious is this situation, and what a good idea those six party talks are, and yes, we can talk to the North Koreans directly, but in the context of the six party talks. A person could be forgiven for thinking that the Bush administration is less about actual diplomacy, and more about protocol.

As wordy and meaningless as Burns presentation struck me, the hour demonstrated almost conclusively how inadequate is the Meet The Press-Russert formula for extracting information from spinning spokespersons.

That catch-ya strategy caught Russert up, and he kept coming back to the same points, without being able to shake Burns wall of words. That’s partly because he wasn’t really looking for answers, for hard information. In fact, by the end of the hour, it became clear that Russert hadn’t mastered even the basics of the last 15 years of our history with North Korea.

What about regime change, asks Russert. Well, says Burns, it’s a terrible regime, terrible to and for its people, but we’re on this diplomatic track…

What about security assurances for North Korea? Oh, they’re in that 2005 agreement, which the N. Koreans just used to light the rockets under those missiles.

What about the change in the President’s tone from 2002 SOTU to last Monday. Well, that was then, this is now, and no, Burns didn’t find anything inconsistent about the President’s approach.

Isn’t it a fact, asks Russert, that North Korea has acquired more nuclear weapons on Bush’s watch. Burns consistently ignored the various forms that inquiry came in.

What about your critics, Ambassador Burns?

Russert started with Newt Gringrich being Newt; the State Department’s failed North Korea strategy of ‘talk forever - act never’ has failed unequivically. Newt was careful to include the Clinton administration by mentioning the time span of 13 years of failure, damn, if only Newt had made it to the presidency; the time has come for action. If we can not abide a nuclear North Korea equipped with missiles to deliver them, then we demand they dismantle all that, if they say no, we dismantle all that. That was the gist of what Russert quoted.

Burns didn’t agree. More six party talks, more patience, more let diplomacy run its course.

What about critics who insist that the policy of isolation, followed by engagement, at least with our five partners, simply hasn’t worked, and yes, North Korea is more nuclear than it was in 2000.

Burns disagreed; the Bush administration has not given up, they will persevere, diplomacy takes time….

Then another critic, from the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative critic, not some pussy Democrat, Russert was at pains to point out; the policy is a failure. My impression, AEI desires some G.I. Joe action. Interestingly, Russert steered clear of any actual discussion of how practical such action would be.

Burns profoundly disagreed with this criticism, more words, all to say, hey guys, we’re on the case.

Russert’s final jab struck me as almost ludicrous, and the perfect example of why this program is so ineffective in providing its audience with actual information.

Bill Kristol was wheeled out, think Hannibal Lecter, wrapped in a devastating quote that points out the following: “North Korea is firing missiles. Iran is going nuclear. Somalia is controlled by radical Islamists. Iraq isn’t getting better, and Afghanistan is getting worse.” Kristol goes on to express his appreciation for Bush’s steadfastness on Iraq, but worries that its challenges have made the administration too passive in regards to all these other challenges.

Is that not rich?

No causal relationship between any of these other disasters and Iraq, of course not.

And why does Kristol get quoted?

He has credibility in Russert & co’s eyes - after all, he was not only a supporter of invading Iraq, he was one of the neo-cons who did the intellectual ground work for convincing Americans that the best way to make ourselves safe was to become an empire. So what’s Kristol’s answer - more of the same - more muscularity, more willingness to take risks, more of everything that has got us into the mess Kristol had just kristolized so clearly.

Works for me.

In a rare move for MTP, three Clinton administration members who were actively involved in North Korean policy were invited to discuss the current situtaion, Ashton Carter, an assit. secretary of state, Robert Gallucci, who was the lead negotiator of the 1994 Agreed Framework, and Bill Richardson, who’s been to North Korea five times.

With half the time that Burns had, these three said twice as much.

This, despite the formula that Russert kept trying to impose on the segment - that Clinton’s way of dealing with North Korea was no more successful than Bushs. Here is where Russert ignorance of the facts was displayed with vivid clarity. Good on Gallucci that he was having none of it.

Russert wanted to push the idea that the Clinton’s administration willingness to engage in direct talks had resulted in a promised agreement, but to no avail, because the North Koreans cheated, i.e. they closed down one plant, but continued at another plant, and produced nuclear weapons on Clinton’s watch, too. At least one, Russert suggested, hopefully.

To back that up, he had a couple of quick clips of Secretary of State Albright, the first, raising a class of champagne with Kim Jong Il, and the second one on Meet The Press, admitting that yes, the N. Korean’s did ultimately cheat.

Gallucci added the details; the Agreed Framework closed down a North Korean program that used spent nuclear fuel rods to make weapons grade

So the answer to Tim’s question is quite simply, “no,” and Gallucci said so with great clarity.

The Clinton administration was able, through direct talks, was to close down an active program that was succeeding in producing weapons grade plutunium. They produced no such material through-out the rest of the Clinton administration. We know that because the agreement included various mechanisms of transparency - inspections, seals, and satellite monitoring.

What we found out, toward the end of the nineties, was that N. Korea had bought from Pakistan, some technology to enrich uranium, a much more difficult process. There is no evidence that they came up with weapon’s grade fissionable material.

All three of these Clinton appointees were blunt about this administration - what they are doing is not working, and meanwhile, North Korea is producing plutonium, more every day.

That’s what was missing from the previous discussion with Burns- that the situation isn’t static; while the Bush administration has refused to first honor the Agreed Framework, then to ignore North Korea, and then to come up with the six-party talks, North Korea has continued to strengthen its nuclear hand.

All three agreed that direct talks were needed, whether within the six party framework, or not.

What about the headlines, Russert wanted to know: Bush blinks. The answer was pretty much the same; it’s not about those kinds of headlines - it’s about a very real threat, and the need for finding a real solution to that threat.

Carter had a slightly more muscular approach than Gallucchi and Richardson - he been willing to entertain the idea of taking out the N. Korean long-range missile if it wasn’t taken down from the launch pad, but he was at pains to point out that this suggestion involved one cruise missile, and was a way of drawing a line in the sand. Also, the suggestion had been predicated on adequate intelligence that the missile had a chance of being operational.

It took Gallucchi and Ashton Carter to bring up the worst case scenario, one that Russert had not presented to Amb Burns - at some point, the North Koreans can give that plutonium to Al Qaeda, they’ll have enough to sell it, to whomever they wish. And a missile defense system isn’t going to help you defend against that one.

It was Ashton Carter who also clarified what the real problem has been with the Bush administration’s policy toward North Korea - the deep divisions within the administration between Defense and State, between Colin Powell and John Bolton; the latter played a major role in the collapse of The Agreed Framework.

Russert hadn’t asked one question about such a division. Natch.

I don’t feel I’ve been able to give justice to the experience of listening to policy makers who are actually saying something, not endless spinning.

I highly recommend reading the transcript of this portion of the MTP when it’s available.

Also, Eric Alterman did a good summary of N. Korea policy Friday on his blog, Altercation, which you can find here