Traditionally, the Second Course of an Italian meal is the Meat Course. Substantial. Satisfying. The Main Event.

Your Second Course today is based on Nur al-Cubicle’s masterful translation of the October 25, 2005 article (2nd of 4 in a series) by Carlo Bonini and Giuseppe D’Avanzo published in Italy’s La Repubblica regarding the dissemination of the phony Niger Yellowcake documents.

This article deals with how the Italians, eager to curry favor with the Bush Administration, look for ways to push their Dodgy Yellowcake Dossier on the Americans who are actively seeking excuses for war with Iraq.

Rebuffed by the more responsible elements in the US Intelligence Community (CIA, State Department) the Italians link up with the purposefully irresponsible elements of the Community (the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans, the office of the White House National Security Advisor and possibly the White House Iraq Group).

The article details how first, reports of the Dodgy Dossier, then the Dodgy Dossier itself travel through the parallel US intelligence pipeline (Seymour Hersh’s “stovepipe”) created by the Neocons.

Berlusconi’s intelligence chief, Nicolo’ Pollari, and the US Neocons work hand in hand to disseminate the “Saddam bought uranium from Niger” story and add a new twist: “the aluminum tubes of Mass Destruction”. Panorama, the Berlusconi-owned weekly magazine, publishes a story in September, 2002 with both ingredients for Warmongering Hysteria.

Prior to October 15, 2001

— Let’s recap the First Course (if it’s not already repeatin’ on ya)

Pollari’s SISMI wants to give credence to the story of acquisition of uranium ore for the purpose of building a nuclear bomb. The scheme is transparent. The “authentic” papers concerning an attempt to acquire uranium in Niger (stale Italian intelligence left over from the 80’s) are a legacy of a former SISMI Deputy Chief in Rome, Antonio Nucera. They are bundled up together with other worthless documents assembled helter-skelter after a simulated burglary of the Niger Embassy (embassy letterhead and stamps are taken). The documents are exhibited by Pollari’s men to the CIA Station Chief in Rome while SISMI’s “postman”, a certain individual by the name of Rocco Martino, delivers a copy to Richard Dearlove’s MI6 in London.

— Now let’s jump right in. Mmm, Meaty!

But is it really true that our [Italian] cloak-and-dagger people worked solely with the CIA? Or did they work as part of the clandestine effort undertaken by the parallel intelligence conduit [“Stovepipe”—Nur] created by Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz within the Iraq War Group [White House Iraq Group (?) — Shystee], the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans and the office of the National Security Advisor—all determined to produce the evidence for “regime change” in Baghdad.

…

La Repubblica has documented the dual channel used by the Italian government and by Italian intelligence. According to intelligence agents, in at least one of the backdoor meetings in which Pollari participated, the the creation of a conduit took place linking government, security agencies and intelligence.

(on or around) October 15, 2001

— Eager to ingratiate themselves with the Bushies, the Italians come bearing a gift: an Italian intelligence report about Saddam buying Yellowcake from Niger

We reintroduce Greg Thielmann, former director of the US Department of State’s intelligence bureau, who encounters the Italian report on the uranium on his desk. He does not recall the precise date.

Thielmann recounts the events of autumn 2001 in generalities. But the precise date may prove revealing: it is October 15, 2001. On that date three events are woven together to produce an astounding coincidence: Nicolò Pollari is appointed to head SISMI by the Italian government on September 27, after serving as Number Two at CESIS (a coordinating intelligence agency at Palazzo Chigi). Silvio Berlusconi is finally invited to the White House by George W. Bush. October 15 marks the date of the first CIA report on the evidence assembled by the Italians.

…

It’s impossible to say if all this is coincidence, but one cannot ignore the context: The Italians possess a burning desire to make themselves useful [I changed this sentence — Shystee]. After his bungling remarks on the Clash of Civilizations, Berlusconi is encountering problems in getting an invitation from the White House, under fire from moderate Arab regimes. Pollari is eager to quickly get in step with Premier and the new course of action. The new chief at the SISMI section in charge of WMD, Colonel Alberto Manenti (direct superior of Antonio Nucera), wants to put himself on the same page as the new SISMI director.

…

It is a known fact that Bush shows the West Wing’s Rose Garden to Berlusconi and the CIA acknowledges, as reported by Russ Hoyle (who has been analyzing the conclusions of the US Congressional Investigation Committee) that Italian intelligence has some neatly prepackaged information with a pretty bow on the box:Negotiations (between Niamey and Baghdad) on the purchase of uranium have been ongoing since the start of 1999; the sale [of uranium to Baghdad] was approved by the Niger Supreme Council in 2000. No documentary evidence is offered to show that any shipment of uranium has occured.

Fall, 2001

— Pollari evaluates the players in the Bush Administration and realizes some are more friendly than others

CIA analysts consider the report to be “somewhat limited” and “lacking in necessary detail”. Intelligence and Research analysts at the US Department of State qualify the intelligence as “highly suspect.”

The first contact with the American intelligence community is not particularly gratifying for Pollari but it is still highly useful. The SISMI director, who is no fool, surveys the landscape and the players of the ongoing behind-the-scenes battle in the American Administration between those who stress caution and pragmatism (the US Department of State and the CIA) and those who are looking for an excuse to start a war (Cheney and the Pentagon), which is already on the drawing board.

Fall/Winter 2001, after the Italians visit the White House

— CIA station chief Jeff Castelli starts giving Pollari the cold shoulder, so Pollari throws himself into Ledeen’s lovin’ Neocon arms

However, when the SISMI director returns to Italy, he perceives a similar battle underway in Rome. Gianni Castellaneta [Palazzo Chigi (the Italian White House) Diplomacy Advisor Gianni Castellaneta (today Italian Ambassador to the United States)] advises Pollari to look in other directions, while Defense Minister Antonio Martino tells Pollari to expect a visit from an old friend of Italy.

This old friend is Michael A. Ledeen, a veteran of American parallel intelligence conduits, who had been previously declared persona non grata by Rome during 1980s. [Likely because of kidnapping of Abu Abbas, orchestrated by Ledeen and Oliver North, and the attempted “extraordinary rendition” of Abbas through Italy—Nur] [also possibly because of his involvement in the Bologna train station bombing and kidnapping of Aldo Moro — Shystee] Ledeen is in Rome on a mission from the Office of Special Plans, created at the Pentagon by Paul Wolfowitz to collect intelligence which would support a war on Iraq. A source at Forte Braschi [equivalent to Langley, VA, the headquarters of the CIA—Nur] tells La Repubblica: On the subject of intelligence collected on the uranium purchase, Pollari gets the cold shoulder from CIA Station Chief Jeff Castelli. Apparently, Castelli has dropped the matter entirely. Taking a hint, Pollari discusses the matter with Michael Ledeen….

Beginning of 2002

— George Tenet is unreceptive, unresponsive

No one knows what prompts Ledeen to return to Washington. But at the beginning of 2002, Paul Wolfowitz convinces Dick Cheney that the uranium trail picked up by Italian intelligence should be explored in closer detail. As the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence relates, a determined Vice President makes request to the CIA to take another look into “the possible acquisition of Niger uranium.” During a meeting, Dick Cheney explicitly states that a crucial piece of intelligence is held by “a foreign intelligence agency”.

…

The parallel intelligence conduit [“Stovepipe”—Nur] over at the Pentagon circulates “new information” according to which there exists an agreement between Niger and Iraq for the supply of 500 tons of uranium per year.

The technicians at the Department of State raise an eyebrow at the report—500 tons of uranium! An exaggerated quantity! The report is manifestly devoid of all plausibility. Every independent report ordered following the circulation of the Italian memorandum indicates that the Niger uranium mines at Arlit and Akouta can yield at most 300 tons per year. But time is growing short. George Tenet, stung by the intelligence gaps of 9-11, grins and bears it but becomes incredibly unreceptive when State Department intelligence controverts him, recounts Greg Thielmann to La Repubblica, by saying that the intelligence collected in Rome is inconsistent, that the uranium story is phony and that a bunch of things contained in the report are fabricated.

Late 2001 or Early-Mid 2002

— Pollari freezes out his Intelligence station chief in Washington because he’s too close to the CIA

This is the snapshot. Pollari is in Washington. He arranges a meeting with George Tenet and, as happens frequently, his presentation is to be given in a reserved conference room at a hotel close to Langley. An attendee at the meeting tells La Repubblica: Pollari’s English must not have been very polished, so a female interpreter is used between him and Tenet. There’s an embarrassing upshot. In the course of exchanging pleasantries, George reveals some information from al-Qaeda concerning Italy which the Agency has gathered from prisoners at Guantanamo. Tenet expects at least a smile or possibly a nod of gratitude. A stony face stares back at him. If at first Tenet found Pollari unpleasant, he now finds him untrustworthy.

…

What what strikes everyone seated around the conference table is the extreme marginalization of Pollari’s station chief in Washington. This bizarre behavior is intriguing. In 2002, the SISMI station chief in Washington is Admiral Giuseppe Grignolo. He possess extensive background in WMD, an excellent relationship with the CIA and the respect of CIA Number 2, Jim Pavitt. A source at Forte Braschi [Italy’s Langley] recalls: The truth is that we did not want to keep the CIA out of our business but Pollari distrusted Grignolo, whom he believed was too cozy with Langley—so he blocked Grignolo’ every move. He forced him, so to speak, into the useless function of background checks on SISMI new hires, who might have spent some time in the United States…

Summer 2002

— Pollari and SISMI work closely with the stovepipers on WMD

[the Forte Braschi source recalls] During those months, serious contact takes place elsewhere—through Condoleezza Rice, through Ledeen and through the Office of Special Plans run by Paul Wolfowitz and Doug Feith.

…

What did you expect them to be talking about in the summer of 2002? Weapons of mass destruction!

September 9, 2002

— Pollari meets with Stephen Hadley in the White House

It is Castellaneta who arranges a meeting for Pollari in the offices of the National Security Advisor at the White House.

…

An Administration official told La Repubblica: I can confirm that on September 9, 2002, General Nicolò Pollari met with Stephen Hadley, deputy to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.

September 9, 2002

— The same Panorama article mentions the Aluminum Tubes of Mass Destruction

As with October 15, 2001, September 9, 2002 was a day marked by several coincidences. On that day, the Italian magazine Panorama was coming up on the editorial deadline for its 12-19 September issue.

…

No one seems to remember that in the 12-19 September 2002 issue, coinciding with Pollari’s meeting with Hadley, Panorama publishes a planetary scoop entitled, War with Iraq? It has already begun. The Panorama article mentions “a delivery of half-ton of uranium”: The men of Mukhabarat, the Iraqi intelligence agency, acquired the ore through a Jordanian middleman in far-away Nigeria, where a few traders succeeded in smuggling it after stealing it from a nuclear depot in a republic of the former USSR. The cargo containing 500 kilograms of uranium was then docked at Amman and afterwards shipped overland in a 7-hour journey to its final destination: the al-Rashidiyah plant 20 km north of Baghdad, recognized as a site for the production and processing of fissile material.

And further along in the article: The alarm concerns Germany, where in the past Iraq had attempted to purchase technology and industrial parts from the firm, Leycochem….and even the much sought-after aluminum tubes for gas centrifuges.

After Pollari returns from his September 9, 2002 meeting with Stephen Hadley

— Pollari is summmoned again, 30 days later, by Parliament and totally contradicts himself: he says he does have documentary proof of the Niger-Iraq-Uranium claim, and also proof of Iraq’s attempt to purchase Aluminum Tubes of Mass Destruction

Back from his secret meeting with Hadley, Pollari was debriefed by an Italian Parliamentary intelligence oversight commission. They summon him twice. In the first session, the SISMI director maintains: We had no documentary proof; only information that a central African nation sold uranium ore to Baghdad. Thirty days later, Pollari says: We had documentary proof of the acquisition by Iraq of uranium ore from a central African nation. We also know of an Iraqi attempt to purchase centrifuges for uranium enrichment from German and possibly Italian manufacturers.

October, 2002

— Rocco sells his Dodgy Dossier to Panorama correspondent Elisabetta Burba

Once out of maw of Parliament, Pollari is still confronted with the problem of conveying the phony dossier to Washington without leaving a trail of fingerprints. He lucks out. SISMI “postman” Rocco Martino, who has already left a package on the doorstep of MI6, contacts Panorama correspondent Elisabetta Burba and attempts to sell her the dossier. But is it the snake oil salesman’s idea—or that of Antonio Nucera—or is someone else behind it?

October, 2002 (cont.)

— Jeff Castelli and the CIA in Rome find the same “half baked frittata” (the Dodgy Dossier) they saw almost a year earier [see First Course] on their plate again

Mrs. Burba rightly double-checks the Niger information.

..

In the meantime, a reliable source comes along. Elisabetta does what a reporter has to do—with rigor and tenacity. She concludes that the story is baseless and refrains from publishing a single sentence.

But unknown to her, it’s already out of her hands—because the magazine’s Editor-in-Chief, Carlo Rossella, entralled with the possibly having found—as he tells his staff—a smoking gun, has forwarded the documents to the US Embassy in Rome, which he regards as the best source of confirmation.

…

Does Pollari notify Berlusconi’s publication, Panorama, which is patting itself on the back over the uranium scoop, that the information is bogus? It appears that he did not. And this is how Jeff Castelli and the CIA came to find on their plate the half-baked frittata which they have been refusing to eat for nearly a year.

October 16, 2002

— The Dodgy Dossier is “misplaced” for three months at Langley and is only found because of an Inspector Genral investigation

The documents are such crude forgeries that they must be hidden from scrutiny lest they rain on Dick Cheney’s parade.

The arrival of the documents in Washington occurs through the back door. They are distributed on October 16, 2002, to the various intelligence agencies by the US Department of State during a routine meeting which four CIA officials attend. But not one of the CIA men is able to recall how they came into possession of the documents or how they came to know of them.

Mysteriously, the Italian forgeries are “misplaced” at Langley for three months and it is only after an internal audit ordered by the Inspector-General that they are found inside a safe in the Anti-Proliferation Section.

Let’s soak up the meaty juices left on the plate

…what is essential here is to notice that in the Panorama article, the recipe (so to speak) has all the right ingredients needed for war: the 500 tons of uranium which make its way from Africa to Baghdad, and the aluminum tubes for nuclear centrifuges.

One could reasonably conclude that the scam churned in Italy could be accurately superimposed on the allegations made in the CIA-gate/New York Times affair. The Government aks. Intelligence delivers. The Media disseminates. [last 3 sentences edited — Shystee]. The government then confirms what’s in the media. It’s an old disinformation technique from the Cold War.

Terrorize and influence public opinion—this time with Italy involved as an accessory. The magazine that spreads the poisonous disinformation is owned by PM Silvio Berlusconi, who controls intelligence in Italy and who wants to become the close ally of George W. Bush, who in turn wants to go to war.

Feeling full yet? Make some room because there’s a Third Course on the way featuring grilled Judy Miller and Aluminum cannelloni. Oh yeah, there’s dessert, too.