What's going on w/ NY's Lawsky's agreement w/ banksters on robo signing?

(edited for clarity)
This is not a "get out of jail free" card, it has nothing to do with that.

Goldman wanted to make a certain acquisition and/or selloff (it's an acquisition; I don't know how I got confused about that part) - that part is hazy to me since I don't know all the involved parties and don't have time to research right now. As a condition of their being able to do that, Lawsky's office (which has oversight of such things) has negotiated a whole list of concessions in exchange for giving them the green light, and without in any way interfering with the ongoing investigation and possible prosecution of past practices, and/or possible penalties for past practices. Note the quote I gave in the previous comment.

Here are the conditions they negotiated, quoted from the news release:

The Agreement makes the following changes:

Ends Robo-signing and imposes staffing and training requirements that will prevent Robo-signing.

Requires servicers to withdraw any pending foreclosure actions in which filed affidavits were Robo-signed or otherwise not accurate.

Requires servicers to provide a dedicated Single Point of Contact representative for all borrowers seeking loss mitigation or inforeclosure, preventing borrowers from getting the runaround by being passed from one person to another. It also restricts referral of borrowers to foreclosure when they are engaged in pursuing loan modifications or loss mitigation.

Requires servicers to ensure that any force-placed insurance be reasonably priced in relation to claims incurred, and prohibits force-placing insurance with an affiliated insurer.

Imposes more rigorous pleading requirements in foreclosure actions to ensure that only parties and entities possessing the legal right to foreclose can sue borrowers.
For borrowers found to have been wrongfully foreclosed, requires servicers to ensure that their equity in the property is returned, or, if the property was sold, compensate the borrower.

Imposes new standards on servicers for application of borrowers' mortgage payments to prevent layering of late fees and other servicer fees and use of suspense accounts in ways that compounded borrower delinquencies and defaults.

Requires servicers to strengthen oversight of foreclosure counsel and other third party vendors, and imposes new obligations on servicers to conduct regular reviews of foreclosure documents prepared by counsel and to terminate foreclosure attorneys whose document practices are problematic or who are sanctioned by a court.

Ocwen and Litton are immediately taking steps to implement these servicing practices. Goldman, which is exiting the mortgage servicing business with the sale of Litton, has agreed to adopt these servicing practices if it should ever reenter the servicing industry.

I always believe that banksters can find the teeniest loophole and march a whole regiment through it, but this is on the face of it at least, a great deal for the people. Lawsky seems to be on board with the AG's programme.

I'm really hoping Yves or one of the other econ bloggers I read analyzes this, but it looks good to me.

It also seems to me that the original post was based on a misconception of what this deal was, not just of who did the deal. Such as:

So, are they being given a get out of screwing up big time free card from NY's AG? Or...??

Looks like the banksters will be self-investigating and self-regulating??

No evidence for either of these, not in the least.

And the original post still says that the deal was the AG's, even though you changed the headline.

I hope people will go and read the Bloomberg article I linked and the news release from Lawsky, and whatever else there is written about this based on actually looking at the deal.

(I really do have to run, but I want to get this said first!)

Yes, it is important to ask questions about this deal and to try and figure out its implications.

The trouble I see is that it is hard to have a useful discussion of the deal when people start out being angry about something they read in the original post, when that thing isn't even part of the actual deal.

That's why I say that I hope people will read the sources I linked, and others which are based on actual information about the deal.

I absolutely do not think that Lawry's news release is the last word on this. I realize what I wrote could be read that way. I just meant to say that he has provided his office's answer to one of the concerns raised here (and others). I eagerly await other people's analysis.

Quick thoughts about what is important to think about here:

In a way the fact that this deal does not immunize Goldman, etc. is a red herring, even though it's good that it was said (because of course that's the question on everyone's mind). AFAIK Lawry (who is a Superintendant in a part of the state Banking Department, in effect a regulator of banking in NY) could not have given immunity as part of the deal even if he wanted to, without the AG's participation. AFAIK only the AG's office can sign off on immunity from prosecution. (That's why the 50, now 49, AGs are the ones making THAT deal.)

One could ask whether the $53 million in writedowns is significant enough. I don't know, but that's one of the first things I will look into when I have time this weekend. Also, the penalties that they will have to pay. Same question.

There is the enforcement issue I mentioned elsewhere.

And of course, there is the question of whether it's a good thing to have fewer and larger mortgage servicers, which is one outcome of this deal. Goldman had to give up all these concessions in order to make that consolidation happen, but one could ask whether the price was high enough given the societal cost of having fewer and bigger players. I dunno.

There are other questions that can be asked, but let's please look at the actual deal before asking, is all I'm saying.